Interests of Acehnese Forgotten

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“THERE’S only one reason for it; the Aceh gubernatorial election.” This is what Mr Suadi Sulaiman, a former member of the rebel Free Aceh Movement, told the Jakarta Post last month when asked to comment on a recent wave of violence in Indonesia’s western-most province.

 It was a grim assessment, reinforced a few days later when a parliamentary fact- finding team from Jakarta announced that it had come to a similar conclusion.

The Helsinki Agreement of August 2005, which ended the 30-year conflict between Aceh rebels and Jakarta, was supposed to stand as a shining example of a just peace. Recent developments in Aceh, however, have demonstrated how quickly squabbling former freedom fighters can forget the noble cause they once claimed to serve.

Since October last year, the province has been wracked by a string of unsolved shootings and firebombings. In the wake of the escalating tensions, officials have announced that they will deploy 780 police officers to ensure that the elections are held peacefully.

The roots of the current unrest are murky, complicated by local resentment over an influx of migrants from other parts of the country.

But the core of the problem – and much of the brutality – is related to a struggle for power between two factions within the former rebel organisation. One faction is linked to the so-called “Swedish” bloc associated with Partai Aceh. The other grouping, sometimes described as the domestic faction, is centred on Governor Irwandi Yusuf, who has no formal political vehicle.

The Aceh Independent Election Commission announced on Jan 30 that provincial elections will be held on April 9, a delay of almost two months following protests from Partai Aceh.

For months, Aceh politicians have been arguing about whether independent candidates should be allowed to run. If they are, observers believe Governor Irwandi has a reasonable chance of winning. If they are not, many expect that Partai Aceh’s formidable political machine would ensure that its candidate, Mr Zaini Abdullah, would have no serious challenger.

The Constitutional Court ruled last year that independents could contest, and that decision has since been upheld. But the recent postponement could disadvantage Mr Irwandi by forcing him to dig deeper into his resources to finance the extended campaign.

What all these former insurgents seem to have forgotten, however, is that some of the key provisions of the Helsinki Agreement demanded by rebel leaders as the price of peace in 2005 have yet to be implemented. One of the most important is the establishment of a South African- style truth and reconciliation commission charged with investigating human rights abuses and awarding compensation to victims. Another neglected provision calls for a human rights court to handle post- conflict abuses.

In the immediate aftermath of the peace deal there was some excuse for the oversight. Mr Irwandi was preoccupied with reconstruction efforts in the wake of the devastating tsunami in December 2004. Also, the former rebels in Partai Aceh, who soon came to dominate the provincial legislature, needed time to learn the mechanics of the legislative process.

Subsequent developments have given those now preoccupied with the trappings of political power even more excuses. In 2006, a national law which mandated the establishment of the truth and reconciliation commission was annulled by the Constitutional Court.

Human rights groups had initially appealed against legislative provisions that seemed to suggest that the commission could declare amnesty for soldiers suspected of human rights abuses. They were shocked when the court responded by throwing out the entire legislation. The move seemed to pander to the concerns of influential military figures worried about where the proposed commission’s investigations into human rights abuses would lead.

The following year, Aceh Deputy Governor Muhammad Nazar announced that the provincial administration was considering establishing its own reconciliation commission. Non-government organisations also began work on suggested by-laws. But the issue has since been forgotten as rival groups battle for control of provincial affairs.

Those responsible for the abuses that took place during the long-running conflict now seem unlikely to be called to answer for their crimes. Equally serious, says Ms Poengky Indarti, spokesman for human rights advocacy group Imparsial, is that rights violations committed in subsequent years may also be ignored.

Ominously, AK-series assault rifles, the weapons of choice of former separatist movement members, have been used in several recent shootings. Since 2005, there have also been renewed complaints against the military, particularly regarding the confiscation of land to construct military posts.

The interests of ordinary Acehnese, it seems, have been forgotten.

(C) Singapore Press Holdings Limited

Key Political Risks

The inability of the government led by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra to bridge the deep divisions between her populist government and its royalist opponents in the military and bureaucracy remains a major concern.

Prime Minister Yingluck has selected a competent economic team, but it is difficult for these technocrats to deliver on the new government's campaign promises without triggering inflation or hurting business. 

The government has also been unable to resolve the ongoing insurgency involving ethnic Malay Muslim rebels in the south.

 

WATCH OUT FOR:

  1. Attempts by the government to amend the constitution. The proposed rewrite is aimed removing legal measures initiated by the royalist generals who overthrew former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the current prime minister's elder brother, in 2006.
  2. Ballooning government debt as officials seek to finance government programmes aimed at subsidising rice prices in order to retain the support of farmers.
  3. The relationship between Prime Minister Yingluck and senior generals. Coups have been a common means of regime change in Thai history, and any attempt by the government to purge royalist elements in the top brass could trigger yet another. Thailand

About Me

My name is Dr Bruce Gale and I am a senior writer with the Singapore Straits Times. I studied at  LaTrobe University (BA Hons) in Melbourne and later at the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies at Monash University (MA). My PhD thesis, which focussed on Malaysian political economy, was completed at the Malaysian National University (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia) in 1987.

From 1988 to 2003 I was Singapore Regional Manager for the Hong Kong based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC). 

I have written several books and articles on Southeast Asian affairs, including Political Risk and International Business: Case Studies in Southeast Asia (Pelanduk Publications, 2007). Books on language include Mastering Indonesian: a guide to reading Indonesian language newspapers (Pelanduk Publications, 2008)

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