Can the Philippines forge lasting peace?

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"ARE we up to this?", Philippine chief government negotiator Alexander Padilla asked as he emerged from the first round of peace talks with communist rebels late last month. It was a good question. Unfortunately, it had no easy answer.

After a six-year hiatus, the Philippine government and the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) met in Norway on Feb 21 to make yet another attempt at forging a peace deal. Whether the two sides are really prepared to make the compromises necessary to achieve lasting peace, however, is difficult to judge.

Sadly, history does not encourage optimism. The first negotiations took place in early 1986 after Mrs Cory Aquino was swept to power on the back of a popular uprising that ended the reign of dictator Ferdinand Marcos. The talks failed. Since then, the country has experienced a depressing pattern in which newly installed presidents (the latest being Mrs Aquino’s son Benigno) initiate peace talks with much fanfare only to have them end in ignominy.

Maoist guerillas have been fighting successive governments in Manila since the late 1960s, when the CPP established the New People’s Army (NPA) as its armed wing. The NPA reached its peak in the mid-1980s, with an estimated 25,000 guerillas. Since then, battle setbacks have sapped its strength, and the number of rebels today is probably no more than about 4,000. Even so, numerous offensives by government troops have failed to force the rebels to surrender. The NPA continues to be blamed for attacks on businesses in rural areas, thereby discouraging much-needed investment in resource-rich regions.

Former president Fidel Ramos, a retired general and former defence chief, made the most progress. It was under his presidency in 1998 that the two sides signed an agreement to respect human rights and international humanitarian law. The pact, the only major achievement in peace negotiations so far, also placed restrictions on the use of landmines, and is still recognised as binding by both sides.

Peace talks collapsed the following year under then-president Joseph Estrada, when the NPA objected to the Senate’s ratification of the Visiting Forces Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. The pact permitted American soldiers to hold exercises and train with Filipino troops.

After Mr Estrada was forced from office over corruption allegations, talks resumed under his successor Gloria Arroyo. But the Norwegian-brokered negotiations, which led to the establishment of a Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) in mid-2004, floundered after the rebels blamed Mrs Arroyo for encouraging the US and some European states to place the NPA on their terrorist blacklists.

The run-up to the latest round of talks has followed the by-now familiar pattern. Soon after being installed as president last year, Mr Aquino announced a variety of concessions aimed at encouraging a revival of negotiations. Both sides also released prisoners. A ceasefire was implemented for the duration of last month’s meeting. But there is much mutual distrust, and it seems likely that there are factions on both sides that would prefer the talks to fail.

Two weeks before the talks were due to begin, a controversy broke out over claims by the Philippine military that the NPA had violated a 1998 agreement on the use of landmines. And then, just hours before the agreed ceasefire took effect, security forces raided a rebel hideout north of Manila and arrested senior rebel leader Alan Jazminez.

There were also allegations of truce violations while the talks were in progress. According to the army, communist rebels attacked troops in Davao Oriental. Reports of clashes on the southern island of Mindanao added to the disquiet.

It is easy to be pessimistic about the revival of the peace process. A similar round of talks with Muslim separatists in the south has also been going slowly.

But there are also grounds for optimism. President Aquino’s election pledge to implement programmes to reduce poverty and improve governance might make him more willing than his predecessors to accommodate rebel demands for agrarian restructuring and socio-economic reforms. Mr Aquino has also placed former human rights lawyers and other people favoured by the communists on his peace negotiating panel.

While the rebels protested against the arrest of Mr Jazminez, describing him as a key consultant in the negotiations, they did not allow this to derail the talks. Nor have they demanded the repeal of the controversial defence pact with the US.
The two sides have agreed to meet again next month and every two months after that, with the avowed aim of resolving one of Asia’s longest-running conflicts by June next year.

Filipinos can only wait and hope. Perhaps the long years of confrontation will yet produce the sort of war weariness needed to end a conflict that appears to have no military solution.

Copyright © 2011 Singapore Press Holdings Ltd

Key Political Risks

President Benigno Aquino has stepped up efforts to lure foreign investors into the country, so far without much success. The country continues to be hobbled by widespread corruption and several long-running insurgencies. 

However, the government has had some success in reducing the budget deficit. The president also remains popular with voters. 

WHAT TO WATCH FOR:

  • Extent to which foreign and domestic investors show interest in big ticket infrastructure projects.
  • Increased spending on the air force and navy to counter Beijing's territorial claims in the disputed Spratly Islands. The issue could become an important point of contention at the East Asia forum in Indonesia in November.
  • The implementation of the "framework agreement" between Manila and the insurgent Moro Islamic Liberation Front announced in early October. If all goes well, a final peace deal may be signed by 2016. 

About Me

My name is Dr Bruce Gale and I am a senior writer with the Singapore Straits Times. I studied at  LaTrobe University (BA Hons) in Melbourne and later at the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies at Monash University (MA). My PhD thesis, which focussed on Malaysian political economy, was completed at the Malaysian National University (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia) in 1987.

From 1988 to 2003 I was Singapore Regional Manager for the Hong Kong based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC). 

I have written several books and articles on Southeast Asian affairs, including Political Risk and International Business: Case Studies in Southeast Asia (Pelanduk Publications, 2007). Books on language include Mastering Indonesian: a guide to reading Indonesian language newspapers (Pelanduk Publications, 2008)

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