Grim Reality Facing Australia's Armed Forces

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LAST week, when the US announced sweeping defence spending cuts in an effort to trim its fiscal deficit, Australia woke to a grim reality. Coming as it does after earlier reductions, there is now the distinct possibility that the US may soon be unable to fight two determined adversaries simultaneously in different parts of the world.

For more than 60 years, defence chiefs in Australia – as well as other American allies in the region – have had the luxury of assuming that the US would be able to come to the country’s aid, no matter what its entanglements were in other parts of the world.

The agreement to train up to 2,500 American Marines near Darwin, announced during US President Barack Obama’s visit to Australia last November, was widely interpreted as an effort by Canberra to buy insurance, particularly against China’s rise.

Singapore, the Philippines and Vietnam have also signed agreements involving increased military cooperation with the US. But it is clear that such countries will have to strengthen their own capabilities as well.

In this context, a series of official and unofficial reports revealing that the battle readiness of Australia’s military is a mere shadow of its formal strength has many observers in Canberra worried.

In February last year, Australia’s media reported that two-thirds of the navy’s fleet of 54 vessels had been at least partially incapacitated by faults, repairs or crew shortages in 2010. The point was dramatically illustrated in the wake of the devastation caused by Cyclone Yasi in Queensland last year, when the navy admitted that none of its three amphibious support ships was able to assist in relief efforts.

Last month, a report prepared for the government by independent British expert John Coles underlined the point. It revealed that just two of the navy’s six Collins Class submarines were in regular service. The study blamed crew shortfalls, lack of spares and unreliable equipment.

Such conclusions sound more like a review of the problems facing a country like the Philippines than that of the armed forces of an advanced Western nation.

Market forces are partly to blame. The Australian Defence Force has been losing out in the competition for technical expertise. Engineers in particular have been attracted by the high salaries on offer in the booming resources industry.

While the navy is facing the most acute manpower shortages, the army is also reportedly short of specialists in artillery, intelligence, transport, supply, signals and military police. The air force also needs pilots and flight instructors.

An unprecedented recruitment campaign to bring in foreign expertise is therefore under way. Much of the effort is focused on Britain, where defence cuts have already resulted in thousands of defence personnel being laid off. But since London has decided not to downsize its submarine fleet, it is unlikely to approve of Canberra’s efforts to woo British submariners. For that, Australia may have to look to the United States.

Other countries being considered are Canada and New Zealand, where similar strategic loyalties and military traditions are expected to facilitate integration into the Australian armed forces. Military personnel recruited overseas, as well as their children under 16, are being offered fast-tracked Australian citizenship after as little as three months’ service. Spouses and children over 16 need to live in the country for four years to be eligible.

These developments come at a time when the army and the navy are undergoing major overhauls which will inevitably require even more foreign experts.

Last month, Defence Minister Stephen Smith announced that an elite army battalion stationed in Queensland was to be trained as rapid response marines. The battalion is to be at the heart of an amphibious force being raised for deployment aboard two 24,000-tonne Canberra-class landing ships being built in Spain at a cost of A$3 billion (S$3.97 billion). Experts from the US Marine Corps and Britain’s Royal Marines, said Mr Smith, will be used to train the regiment.

Canberra also has plans to spend A$18 billion on a new fleet of 12 state-of-the- art submarines.

Recruiting foreign specialists is only part of the solution, of course. Holding on to them and ensuring that more of the military’s experts do not leave will involve improving pay and conditions. More attractive career paths may also need to be considered.

But the Coles report on Australia’s submarine fleet revealed another problem that has yet to be systematically addressed. It found there had been a lack of cohesion in leadership and no long-term strategic plan for the efficient use of assets. Mr Smith has since been talking about the need for “fundamental reform”.

Could it be that other sections of the military require a major overhaul? If so, it is in Australia’s interests, as well as those of its allies in the region, that such issues are speedily addressed.

(C) Singapore Press Holdings Limited

Key Political Risks

Asia is the fastest growing region in the world, and is likely to remain so in 2013. However, a number of risks cloud the picture.

The good news is that domestic demand in the region remains strong and should continue to cushion the impact of weaker external demand on overall economic growth. The completion of national elections in Japan and South Korea in December 2012 should also help reduce political uncertainties. 

But Asian governments will need to guard against the adverse impact of prolonged easy financial conditions on inflation.

Rising inequality also continues to threaten social stability. Ethnic and religious rivalries remain just below the surface in many countries. When combined with government corruption and (in some countries) high youth unemployment, this could become a deadly mix. This seems particularly true of China.

Territorial disputes also require close monitoring. Much diplomatic activity in the new year is likely to be centered on finding ways to reduce tensions over resource-rich islands in the South China Sea, where Beijing's claims overlap with those of Japan, Vietnam and other Southeast Asian states. South Korea and Japan also have rival territorial claims.

North Korea remains the wild card. Inclined to believe its own propaganda, Pyongyang's new leadership could miscalculate, making belligerent moves that plunge the region into a military conflict that nobody wants.

About Me

My name is Dr Bruce Gale and I am a senior writer with the Singapore Straits Times. I studied at  LaTrobe University (BA Hons) in Melbourne and later at the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies at Monash University (MA). My PhD thesis, which focussed on Malaysian political economy, was completed at the Malaysian National University (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia) in 1987.

From 1988 to 2003 I was Singapore Regional Manager for the Hong Kong based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC). 

I have written several books and articles on Southeast Asian affairs, including Political Risk and International Business: Case Studies in Southeast Asia (Pelanduk Publications, 2007). Books on language include Mastering Indonesian: a guide to reading Indonesian language newspapers (Pelanduk Publications, 2008)

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