Peace Still Eluding Thai South

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ON MAY 4, four local government officials were assassinated while travelling by sedan along a road in Saiburi, a district in the southern Thai province of Pattani. Reports say gunmen on a pickup truck opened fire on them with AK-47 and M16 assault rifles.

Given the wave of seemingly random attacks that has swept Thailand’s southern border provinces since the insurgency first erupted in January 2004, the incident seemed almost routine.

Indeed, the rebels are often depicted by government spokesmen as uncoordinated, lacking popular support and reduced to desperate revenge attacks.

But the May 4 attack was no random assault. The assailants made off with 300,000 baht (S$12,200) in cash meant to pay the salaries of village defence volunteers. Coordinated attacks against police and military targets are also increasingly common. Clearly, the insurgents are well organised and have access to a sophisticated surveillance network.

Contrast this attention to detail with actions of successive Thai governments in recent years. They have been so preoccupied with the political machinations in Bangkok since the 2006 coup that the problems in the south have been virtually ignored.

The insurgents have made few public demands and their leadership remains obscure. However, the fact that the violence has been concentrated in the southern border provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat, all of which were once part of the independent Malay-Muslim sultanate of Pattani, has led observers to conclude that it is essentially a separatist movement feeding off decades of misrule by Buddhist Bangkok.

Since taking power in August last year, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra has made some effort to change all this. But a combination of official bungling and weak government in Bangkok are likely to ensure that success remains elusive.

The new government has redoubled efforts to improve economic conditions in the south, including the establishment of a special economic zone to stimulate investment. Crucially, officials have also held out the prospect of granting the southern provinces greater autonomy, recognising the distinct identity of the nation’s Malay Muslims in the process.

Such moves make sense. However, they are unlikely to work. One reason for this is the fact that Ms Yingluck has apparently given her brother Thaksin Shinawatra the authority to negotiate on the government’s behalf.
At a secret meeting reportedly held with exiled Muslim insurgent leaders in Malaysia in the middle of March, Mr Thaksin is said to have expressed regret for the violent incidents carried out by the authorities during his administration, saying he had been “misinformed” about the true situation.

However, the organisation believed to have the closest working relationship with armed militants operating on the ground refused to attend. Elders of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), told the Thai Nation newspaper through intermediaries that they “could never forgive Mr Thaksin for what he has done to the Malays of Patani” when he was premier.

They pointed in particular to the Tak Bai massacre of October 2004, and the fact that none of those involved have been brought to justice. Mr Thaksin’s tough line towards southern Malay insurgents during his premiership from 2001 to 2006 was accompanied by a serious deterioration in the security situation. Relations with Malaysia were also strained after Mr Thaksin accused Kuala Lumpur of providing shelter to Muslim terrorists.

Yet another problem is the reluctance of the BRN-C to reveal the identities of its leaders.

With Bangkok appointing an unpopular negotiator, and the insurgent leadership unwilling to surface, meaningful negotiations seem very unlikely.

Potential mediators, such as the 56-member Organisation of Islamic Conference, could play a useful role. But successive Bangkok governments have avoided this option for fear that the issue would become internationalised.

Further complicating the picture is the army’s opposition to any attempt to give the southern provinces any real autonomy. Fearing yet another military coup, the Yingluck government has gone out of its way to avoid challenging the army’s high command. Just how the Prime Minister intends to implement political devolution in the south without alienating the military is far from clear.

Even so, the status quo cannot continue for long. The almost daily attacks are increasing in both frequency and scale. On March 31, four bombs exploded in Yala shopping districts and the parking lot of a hotel in Hat Yai. Sixteen people were killed and more than 300 were injured. Numerous shootings have taken place since.

Presumably the army will soon be demanding yet another bloody crackdown along the lines of that last seen during Mr Thaksin’s administration. Sadly, the failure of current peace efforts will likely provide the perfect excuse.

(C) Singapore Press Holdings Limited 

Key Political Risks

The inability of the government led by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra to bridge the deep divisions between her populist government and its royalist opponents in the military and bureaucracy remains a major concern.

Prime Minister Yingluck has selected a competent economic team, but it is difficult for these technocrats to deliver on the new government's campaign promises without triggering inflation or hurting business. 

The government has also been unable to resolve the ongoing insurgency involving ethnic Malay Muslim rebels in the south.

 

WATCH OUT FOR:

  1. Attempts by the government to amend the constitution. The proposed rewrite is aimed removing legal measures initiated by the royalist generals who overthrew former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the current prime minister's elder brother, in 2006.
  2. Ballooning government debt as officials seek to finance government programmes aimed at subsidising rice prices in order to retain the support of farmers.
  3. The relationship between Prime Minister Yingluck and senior generals. Coups have been a common means of regime change in Thai history, and any attempt by the government to purge royalist elements in the top brass could trigger yet another. Thailand

About Me

My name is Dr Bruce Gale and I am a senior writer with the Singapore Straits Times. I studied at  LaTrobe University (BA Hons) in Melbourne and later at the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies at Monash University (MA). My PhD thesis, which focussed on Malaysian political economy, was completed at the Malaysian National University (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia) in 1987.

From 1988 to 2003 I was Singapore Regional Manager for the Hong Kong based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC). 

I have written several books and articles on Southeast Asian affairs, including Political Risk and International Business: Case Studies in Southeast Asia (Pelanduk Publications, 2007). Books on language include Mastering Indonesian: a guide to reading Indonesian language newspapers (Pelanduk Publications, 2008)

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