Football Woes Reflect Society's Fouls

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FOOTBALL is very popular in Indonesia. Yet, despite its population of almost 240 million, Indonesia hardly figures on the international or regional football scene. There was no Indonesian team at the World Cup in South Africa earlier this year, and the country has never won South-east Asia’s biannual Tiger Cup. 

The game is played all over the country, even in urban slums where a shortage of suitable open spaces forces participants to modify the rules. Local clubs have large followings – up to 60,000 in the case of Jakarta Jakmani, the official fan club of Persija Jakarta. And matches played by local teams attract far larger crowds than those in most other parts of the region, Singapore and Malaysia included.

In the 1956 Olympics, for example, Indonesia drew with the Soviet Union (the eventual champions) before being forced out.

So what is so wrong with Indonesian football today?

Most of the sport’s problems appear to lie with the inept and allegedly corrupt Football Association of Indonesia (PSSI). Indeed, many of the woes of Indonesian football mirror those facing the wider society. These include corruption, administrative inefficiency, large sums spent on quick-fix solutions that never seem to resolve longstanding problems, and lax disciplinary action against those who violate the rules.

The PSSI is run by Mr Nurdin Halid, a Golkar MP who has been implicated in several corruption scandals. After being jailed in September 2007, he ran the organisation from his prison cell for 14 months. This was a clear violation of Fifa protocols. But PSSI officials continued to support him.

The PSSI’s vice-chairman is Mr Nirwan Bakrie, the younger brother of Golkar chairman and controversial tycoon Aburizal Bakrie. Indeed, almost all PSSI officials are politicians, entrepreneurs or well-connected lawyers. None of the decision-making positions is held by former players.

Allegations of match fixing have never been proven. But local competitions often produce puzzling results, given the known abilities of the players. Constant changes in schedules, sometimes only one or two days before a competition, also suggest a serious lack of planning.

Efforts to improve Indonesia’s international standing in the game have so far been expensive failures. For example, the PSSI is currently running a four-year US$2.1 million (S$2.8 million) programme which involves a specially selected Under-18 team training in Uruguay. But last year, an Under-19 team comprising youngsters who had played in Uruguay for two years, failed to reach the 2010 AFC Under-19 Championship, even though Indonesia hosted its qualifying group.

Yet another scheme involves wooing talented players from foreign countries, notably Australia and the Netherlands.

Naturalisation is common in sports. But it can also be expensive. In any case, it hardly qualifies as a solution to the woes of Indonesian football, even if foreign players could somehow be induced to give up the much better opportunities they have in their home countries.

The latest plan involves inviting teams from Brazil and Argentina to play friendly matches to help the national squad prepare for the Asean Football Federation Cup in December.

Meanwhile, long-term projects to improve local football leagues or establish junior academies remain either under-funded or non-existent. Yet just inviting Brazil to play an international friendly is expected to cost the soccer body US$1.5million.

The PSSI does not seem serious about enforcing the rules. On several occasions, Mr Nurdin has overturned disciplinary committee rulings suspending players for assault or other serious offences during matches. Few details of the PSSI’s financial position have been made public. The government provides some financial support through the National Sports Committee. Private sector sponsors such as Nike (which supports the national team) and clove cigarette manufacturer Jarum (which sponsors Indonesia’s Super League) provide additional income. Unsurprisingly, local broadcast rights are held by ANTV, a television station owned by the Bakrie Group.

PSSI officials claim they do not get paid. But local critics argue that, with the numerous kickbacks that come with the job, they hardly need the money.

A national soccer congress was held earlier this year in an attempt to resolve the problems facing the sport. Proposed by former national players and fan groups across the country, the congress was strongly backed by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. But its recommendations, which included restructuring the PSSI and implementing early-age talent development programmes, got nowhere when PSSI representatives refused to regard them as binding.

With its close links to senior Golkar leaders, the PSSI leadership seems set to remain the main impediment to the development of Indonesian soccer for years to come.

Copyright © 2010 Singapore Press Holdings Ltd

Key Political Risks

The inability of the government led by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra to bridge the deep divisions between her populist government and its royalist opponents in the military and bureaucracy remains a major concern.

Prime Minister Yingluck has selected a competent economic team, but it is difficult for these technocrats to deliver on the new government's campaign promises without triggering inflation or hurting business. 

The government has also been unable to resolve the ongoing insurgency involving ethnic Malay Muslim rebels in the south.

 

WATCH OUT FOR:

  1. Attempts by the government to amend the constitution. The proposed rewrite is aimed removing legal measures initiated by the royalist generals who overthrew former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the current prime minister's elder brother, in 2006.
  2. Ballooning government debt as officials seek to finance government programmes aimed at subsidising rice prices in order to retain the support of farmers.
  3. The relationship between Prime Minister Yingluck and senior generals. Coups have been a common means of regime change in Thai history, and any attempt by the government to purge royalist elements in the top brass could trigger yet another. Thailand

About Me

My name is Dr Bruce Gale and I am a senior writer with the Singapore Straits Times. I studied at  LaTrobe University (BA Hons) in Melbourne and later at the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies at Monash University (MA). My PhD thesis, which focussed on Malaysian political economy, was completed at the Malaysian National University (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia) in 1987.

From 1988 to 2003 I was Singapore Regional Manager for the Hong Kong based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC). 

I have written several books and articles on Southeast Asian affairs, including Political Risk and International Business: Case Studies in Southeast Asia (Pelanduk Publications, 2007). Books on language include Mastering Indonesian: a guide to reading Indonesian language newspapers (Pelanduk Publications, 2008)

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