MCA spat reflects wider strife

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RECENT developments suggest that the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) – the second-largest party in the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition – is about to embark on yet another round of self-flagellation. What is it about the MCA that encourages such self-destructive behaviour?

Answering this question is not easy. But it is most likely related to the nature of Malaysia’s ethnic Chinese community and the fact that MCA leaders, while close to the centre of power, have limited access to government largesse.

Political observers have been quick to draw parallels between the current spat pitting MCA president and Transport Minister Ong Tee Keat against his former deputy Chua Soi Lek, and the turmoil that began in March 1984. That epic battle, between then acting party president Neo Yee Pan and then vice-president Tan Koon Swan, began as a dispute over the issue of “phantom” members.

But after Datuk Neo sacked his rivals and refused to recognise a petition by the Tan faction calling for an extraordinary general meeting, the party was plunged into months of near anarchy. The matter was not resolved until November 1985.
Other Malaysian political parties – Prime Minister Najib Razak’s United Malays National Organisation (Umno) included – have experienced similar power struggles. But the MCA’s record seems particularly depressing.

In 2001, for example, a decision by the MCA leadership to purchase a Chinese- language newspaper triggered yet another bitter split, this time between then party president Ling Liong Sik and his deputy Lim Ah Lek. Veteran party watchers can cite other destructive rivalries dating back to the 1970s.

One reason for the frequency of factional struggles within the MCA is that as descendants of immigrants, Malaysian Chinese have long lacked the stabilising influence of traditional hierarchical structures of the sort represented in the Malay community by the sultans.

Nor has respect for authority been inculcated through employment in the government bureaucracy. As a result, Malaysian Chinese leaders enjoy nowhere near the same level of deference that Malay politicians enjoy.

An incident that took place at a convocation ceremony in Kajang in January this year illustrates the point. United Chinese School Committees Association of Malaysia president Yap Sin Tian was giving a speech to about 500 people, including students, parents and guests, when a man walked onto the stage and punched him in the face. Dr Yap was later taken to hospital with a fractured cheekbone and nose. Witnesses identified the attacker as a former student who was angry at Dr Yap’s refusal to support the reappointment of the college’s popular principal, Dr Kua Kia Soong. Such an attack would be almost unthinkable in the Malay community.

The idea of a centralised administrative authority is readily accepted by Malays. But Malaysian Chinese have traditionally been much more independent- minded. As a result, notes Ms Rita Sim, deputy chairman of the Institute of Strategic Analysis and Policy Research (Insap), “while there are many Chinese leaders, there is no leader of the Chinese community”. Even the MCA, she notes, is regarded as little more than a “political connector”. Insap is an MCA-sponsored think- tank.

According to it, there are more than 7,000 Chinese associations in Malaysia, of which about 2,000 are active. They include chambers of commerce, educational associations and clan groups. All are quick to guard their independence.

The point was amply illustrated earlier this year when, after emerging from a bruising internal power struggle of its own last year, the influential Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Malaysia engaged in a very public spat with the Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia. At issue was which organisation was the most qualified to serve as the umbrella group of the Chinese community.

Interestingly, the MCA was never considered a contender. Nor were MCA leaders invited to attend a carefully staged peace dinner with other community leaders held late last month, during which the two groups pledged to work together.

Yet another reason for the MCA’s troubles is that, while it does not actually run the government, joining the party is still regarded as the surest means by which ambitious ethnic Chinese politicians can gain access to power and the spoils that go with it. And today, despite the fact that the MCA has lost the support of around 85 per cent of the country’s ethnic Chinese voters, the stakes are higher than ever. According to Ms Sim, the party’s assets are now worth an estimated RM2 billion (S$816 million).

Even so, the resources available to an MCA president seeking to consolidate his influence are limited in comparison with the largesse an Umno leader can draw upon. Inevitably, some groups will feel neglected. And that is when the trouble begins.

Copyright © 2009 Singapore Press Holdings Ltd

Key Political Risks

Now that the general assembly of UMNO, the senior partner in the ruling National Front coalition government, is over, the long-awaited general election could be held at any time. Constitutionally, Prime Minister Najib Razak has to call elections before April 21st 2012, after which the Elections Commission must hold the election within 60 days.

Widely expected to be the most hotly contested in Malaysian history, the polls will pit Mr Najib's government against a rival political coalition led by charismatic opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim. 

While the opposition Pakatan Rakyat alliance attacks what is says are the corrupt and authoritarian ways of the government, Mr Najib has been describing the opposition coalition as an unnatural alliance of Islamic fundamentalists and multi-ethnic and liberal parties.

The strong economy is likely to favour the government.

WATCH OUT FOR:

  • The size of the expected government victory, particularly the ability of the ruling party to retake control of key states such as Selangor. Mr Najib needs to win convincingly if he is to implement long-delayed economic reforms. These include reducing oil and food subsidies and introducing a goods and services tax to boost government revenue.
  • The ability of Mr Najib to placate conservative elements of his Muslim-based UMNO party who disapprove of his policy of boosting national unity through greater inter-faith and ethnic tolerance.
  • The extent to which the government is able to convince the public that the coming elections will be free and fair. If the election result is close, influential organisation such as Bersih could declare them illegitimate, and stage major protests.

About Me

My name is Dr Bruce Gale and I am a senior writer with the Singapore Straits Times. I studied at  LaTrobe University (BA Hons) in Melbourne and later at the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies at Monash University (MA). My PhD thesis, which focussed on Malaysian political economy, was completed at the Malaysian National University (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia) in 1987.

From 1988 to 2003 I was Singapore Regional Manager for the Hong Kong based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC). 

I have written several books and articles on Southeast Asian affairs, including Political Risk and International Business: Case Studies in Southeast Asia (Pelanduk Publications, 2007). Books on language include Mastering Indonesian: a guide to reading Indonesian language newspapers (Pelanduk Publications, 2008)

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